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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE 0. BISHOP, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
CHARLES HOLLIS NIELSEN,
Defendant and
Third-Party Plaintiff
Respondent,

Case No. 17082

vs.
GENICE GAY BISHOP,
Third-party Defendant
Appellant.
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF, RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action filed by plaintiff, George 0. Bishop,
Jr., against defendant, Charles Hollis Nielsen, for property
damage incurred to plaintiff's vehicle in an automobile accident.
Defendant filed a third-party complaint against the driver of
plaintiff's vehicle, Genice Gay Bishop, for damage incurred by
defendant's vehicle and for contribution upon plaintiff's cause
of action against defendant.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Respondent agrees with the disposition recital of
facts as set forth in Appellants' Brief.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant, and Third-Party Plaintiff, Respondent,
Charles Hollis Nielsen, seeks to have a judgment rendered for
30% contribution against Genice Gay Bishop affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Respondent agrees with the Statement of Facts as
set forth by the Appellant with the additional information which
the court should have.
The Third-party Plaintiff, Respondent, Charles Hollis
Nielsen, does not deny that the Third-party Defendant was born on
June 30, 1960, and that she was 17 years of age at the time of the
accident, and she lived with her parents.

It was also stipulated

in court that Genice Gay Bishop was not the owner of the car
and was not the agent of her father at the time of the accident.
The actual truth of the matter is that neither Charles
Hollis Nielsen, Genice Gay Bishop or George 0. Bishop, Jr. really
have any interest in the matter.

Northwestern National Insurance

Co. of Salt Lake City is the insurance carrier for George O. Bishop
Jr. and Genice Gay Bishop, and Bear River Mutual Insurance Co. is
the insurance carrier for Charles Hollis Nielsen.

This matter is

being brought pursuant to the insurance policies which provide
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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for subrogation.

And under the subrogation receipt and insuring

agreements the actions and complaints are brought nominally in the
names of the plaintiff and the defendant.

So the suit here does

not bog itself down on an inter-family immunity problem, but it
is an inter-family insurance company or carrier problem.

That is

\

liability as to who is going to pay for the damages arising out of
the accident or the contribution and comparative negligence of each
of the parties as hereinafter stated is the question and it is
sheer hypocrisy to indicate any inter-£.amily immunity or interfamily conflict is involved here because all we have are the
various parties testifying in relationship to inter-family insurance companies and the law of liability and contribution in respect
to each of them.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT, CHARLES HOLLIS NIELSEN, CAN RECOVER
JUDGMENT FOR CONTRIBUTION FROM THE THIRD-PARTY
DEFENDANT, GENICE GAY BISHOP, UNDER THE UTAH
CONTRIBUTION STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
§78-27-39, (Repl. 1977).
Under Utah law the right to contribution only exists
against one who is "jointly or severally liable in tort for the
same injury."

U.C.A. §78-27-40(3), 1953, as amended.

The Utah contribution amont joint tort feasors act
provides:

"The right of contribution shall exist among joint

tort feasors . . . "

U.C.A. §78-27-39 (Repl. 1977)

A joint tort

feasor is defined as:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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One of two or more persons, jointly or severally
liable in tort for the same injury to person or
property, whether or not judgment has been
recovered against all or some of them.
U. C. A. § 7 8- 2 4- 7 0 ( 3) (Rep 1. 19 7 7)
Therefore, under the statute, even though a person may
be negligent in reference to a particular accident or a particular
injury, he cannot be liable for contribution for that accident
and for damages unless he has an enforceable action against him
for the injury itself.
The jury in the above-entitled case found that Genice
Gay Bishop was 30% negligent and Charles Hollis Nielsen was 70%
negligent in causing the damages to the automobile of George 0.
Bishop Jr.

This

Third-party Plaintiff, Respondent states that

the trial court was correct in assessing negligence on a comparative basis because they were both joint tort feasors and both
were responsible for the damages to the automobile owned by
Genice Gay Bishop's father, George 0. Bishop, Jr.
The real question is, as we will hereafter explain,
whether George 0. Bishop Jr. can recover and require the insurance
carrier of Genice Gay Bishop to repair his car 100% when his
daughter was 30% negligent in the cause of the accident.

The

question is whether George 0. Bishop's insurance carrier, fronting
through George 0. Bishop Jr. can require Bear River Mutual Insurance Co. to pay 100% of its claim on the repair of George 0.
Bishop Jr. 's car so that his daughter can go out and drive it
through another light or stop sign.

George 0. Bishop, Jr. and
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Genice Gay Bishop, his daughter, say that we cannot recover contribution from his daughter because of "the inter-family iIImlunity
doctrine".
There are many ALR citations on this commencing in
1951, as set forth in 19 ALR 2d 425, at page 3; 60 ALR 2d page 1286,
in 1958; and 41 ALR 3d in 1972.

If the above entitled court will

note and take observance, the said Bishops in this case used the
authorities in 19 ALR 2d and 60 ALR 2d, but failed to use the
41 ALR 3d in 1972.

What was true in 1951 and 1958 at the time

those annotations were written has been drastically changed and
the law has undergone a complete revision in the 25 years.
The background and the SU11llllary of the inter-family
inrrnunity doctrine is discussed extensively by the annotator in
41 ALR 3d at page 909 as follows:
"The law with respect to the liability of parents
for the negligent injuries of their children has
been, and continues to be, in a highly unsatisfactory
state, as evidenced by the great variety of identifiably distinguishable holdings, the differences in
emphasis in decisions ostensibly following similar
rules, the shifting of positions either in specific
terms or by changes in interpretation of governing
cases, the proliferation of exceptions and limitations
to varyingly defined general rules, and the apparently
completely irreconcilable basic premises invoked as
the fundamental rationale.
A reading of the cases suggests that a cause for the
present and apparently growing confusion on this
subject is, at least to some degree, a basic conflict
in the social outlook of various courts, with some
feeling that parental tort irrrrnunity was necessary to
the very existence of an ordered society, in which the
family might be considered a form of government,
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and others feeling a need to bring a measure of
orderliness and syrmnetry to the applicable legal
concepts, all of .which basic conflicting outlooks
were exacerbated by continuing criticism by legal
theoreticians, by changing concepts with respect to
the family, and by changing economic realities,
particularly the advent of the automobile and the
prevelence of liability insurance.
The origins of the parental inrrnunity doctrine provide an initial source of weakness. · It appears that
prior to the year 1891, only three cases dealing with
the tort liability of parents and persons in loco
parentis had appeared, in all of which more or less
support was given to the idea of liability, at least
as applied to cases of gross neglect, unreasonable
punishment, and acts injurious to the life or health
of the child or constituting a public offense. It
appears that the modern doctrine of parental irmnunity
for negligently caused injuries grew out of holdings
in three early cases which involved wilful tort,
without precedent in cormnon law. The courts employed
language in favor of immunity which was seized upon
and followed by many cases thereafter notwithstanding
the fact that the courts cited no authority for their
proposition. The courts said, in effect, that the peace
of society and of families, as well as a sound public
policy designed to subserve the repose of families
and the best interestsof society, barred the minor
child from asserting a claim to civil redress for
personal injuries suffered at the hands of the
parent. It appears that from these cases developed
the thesis, accepted in a majority of the states,
holding a parent immune from suit by a child for
injuries negligently inflicted. Thereafter, the courts
with surprising unanimity, followed the immunity doctrine, initially finding little difficulty in applying
the doctrine to negligence cases in view of their
position where wilful tort was involved.
The first strong, well-reasoned, and extensively quoted
attack on the immunity doctrine in a case involving
parental negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle
came in 1923 in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
Clark in Small v. Morrison (1923) 185 NC 577, 118 SE
12 , 31 AL R 113 5 . ·k -.,'\ ·k
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While the existence of liability insurance would appear
to be a major element causing the general erosion of
the parental tort immunity doctrine, the courts which
have recognized various exceptions to the rule have
generally stated that insurance coverage could not
create liability where noneexisted otherwise, but
that such coverage was a factor to be considered
in the weight to be given the reasons advanced in favor
of the doctrine, while other courts appear to have
refused to give the matter of insurance coverage any
consideration.
number of courts have abandoned the

courts reco nizin t e nee
or arent
immunit
under certain circumstances to be etermined on a
case-by-case basis, and with still other courts enunciating a general limitation to the nonimmunity rule
whereby suits would be barred where the case involved
parental authority over the child or exercise of
ordinary parental discretion with respect to the care
of the child. While in general the abrogation of the
immunity doctrine has been grounded on the consideration of general legal principles, there is at least
some authority to the effect that unemancipated minor
children have a right to sue their parents for negligently inflicted injuries by virtue of constitutional
and statutory provisions declaring that everyone is
responsible to another for injuries caused by want of
ordinary care of skill. * * *
In sunnnary, it is clear that with an apparent trend
in the direction of permitting tort actions by minor
children against their parents, the courts are abandoning the position of an early case that such suits
would be unseemly and not in keeping with the eternal
fitness of things.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The following states in dealing with the liability of
a parent for negligent injury to an unemancipated child, have
specifically

abrogat~d

the parental tort immunity doctrine, or in

recognition of such abrogation, have taken the position that as a
general rule, a parent may be liabile to his child for injuries
caused by the parent's negligence, at least in the absence of
special circumstances excepting the parent from such liability
or

lim~ting

the scope thereof.

Alaska--Hebel v. Hebel, (1967, Alaska) 435 P2d 8.
Arizona--Streenz v. Streenz, (1970) 106 Ariz 86,
471 P2d 282, 41 ALR 3d 891.
Cal--Gibson v. Gibson, (1970) 3 Cal 3d 914,
92 Cal Rptr 288, 479 P2d 648.
Hawaii--Peterson v. Honolulu, (1969) 51 Hawaii 484,
462 P2d 1007.
Minn--Silesk~

v. Kelman, (1968) 281 Hinn 431,

161 NW2d 6 1.

NH--Briere v. Briere, (1966) 107 NH 432, 224 A2d 588.
NJ--France v. A.P.A. Transport Corp., (1970) 56 NJ 500,
267 A2d 490.
NY--Gelbman v. Gelbman, (1969) 23 NY2d 434, 297 NYS
2d 529, 245 NE2d 192.
ND--Nuelle v. Wells, (1967, ND) 154 NW2d 364.
Vt--Xaphes v. Mossey, (1963, DC Vt) 224 F Supp 578,
infra, applying Vermont law.
Wis--Goller v. White, (1963) 20 Wis 2d 402, 122 NW2d
193.
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In 59 Am. Jur. 2d, "Parent and Child", § 151, Tort Actions,
page 252, the volume was written in 1971 and the cumulative supplement
of 1978 in addition to the ALR citations show at least ten more
states have abolished the "PARENTAL IMMUNITY RULE", they are as
follows:
Ky-Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 SW2d 921.
Mich--Plumley v. Klein, 199 NW2d 169.
Va--Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 SE2d 190.
Pa--Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A2d 351.
W. Va--Lee v. Comer, 224 SE2d 721
D.C.--Perchell v. District of Columbia, 444 F2 997
Ill--Schenk v. Schenk, 241 NE2d 1
Nev--(1974), David Rupert v. Andre Jean Steinne, 528 P.2d
1013.
Vt.--Wood v. Wood, (1977) 370 A2d 191
NC--After its court upheld it, abolished it by statute.
To show the general rationale of the cases which certainly
appear to be more convincing than any of the non basic rationale
of the previous cases, is the case of Sharen Streenz v. James T.
Streenz, 471 P.2d 282 (Ariz. 1970), Sharon Streenz, a minor, brought
an action against per parents for damages arising out of an automobile accident.
The Supreme Court of, Arizona said:
"Although most state courts have adopted the parental
immunity doctrine, there have been notable exceptions
. . . We find that the rationale of these cases and
legal authorities, arguing in favor of partial abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine, are more
consistent with contemporary conditions and concepts
of fairness.

-9-
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"Even in jurisdictions where parental immunity has been
openly embraced, courts have evinced hostility for the
doctrine by creating numerous exceptions to its applications. Thus, in most states, an unemancipated child
may sue his parents under contract or property theory."
The Supreme Court of Arizona then went on to say:
"(l) We feel that two principal factors undermine
Judge Malloy's 'domestic tranquility' rationale
expressed in Purcell v. Frazer, supra, and compel an
overruling of that case. One factor, as expressed
above, is that the common law has long permitted child
to sue parent in property or contract. It is not
unsafe to say that some of the most bitter family disputes arise over property, and yet parental immunity
does not limit causes of action in this area. Is it
reasonable to say that our law should protect the property and contract rights of a minor more zealously than
the rights of his person?

I!

fi?:J

Q_ tJO}./'

~

Secondly, we cannot ignore the almost universal
existence of liability insurance, particularly in the
automobile accident realm. Where such insurance
exists, the domestic tranquility argument is hollow,
~for in realit the sou ht after liti ation is not
' etween c i
an parent s insurance carrier.

The court then went on to say:
"(2) While we are persuaded that parental immunity
from tort action by an unemancipated child should be
retained for limited purposes such as those set down
by the Wisconsin court.
(1) Where the alleged negligent act involves
an exercise of parental authority over the
child; and
(2) where the alleged negligent act involves
an exercise of ordinary parental discretion
with respect to the provision of food, clothing,
housing, medical and dental services, and other
care, 122 N.W.2d at 193.
we find it unnecessary at this time to delineate the
scope in which the parental immunity rule will be
applied. Our holding, permitting Sharon Streenz
to sue her parents in tort, is limited to the factual
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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situation before us. We specifically hold that an
une~ancipated minor child has a right of action
against her parents for injuries incurred in an
accident allegedly caused by her mother's negligent
driving."
In the case of Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y. 2d 434, 297
N.Y.S. 2d 529, 245 N.E.2d 192, 194 (1969) the Supreme Court of
New York again abrogating the inter-family irnmunitv doctrine in
reference to automobile accidents said:
"The argument fails to explain how the possibility of
fraud would be magically removed merely by the
child's attainment of legal majority. Nor does the
argument pretend to present the first instance in
which there is the possiblity of a collusive and
fraudulent suit. There are analogous situations in
which we rely upon the ability of the jury to distinguish between valid and fraudulent claims. The
effectiveness of the jury system will pertain in the
present situation. The definite and vital interest
of society in protecting people from losses resulting
from accidents should remain paramount."
In Goller vs. White, 122 NW 2d, 198 (1963), the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin placed the first wedge in the whole doctrine
of the inter-family immunity and abrogated a whole line of previous
Wisconsins decisions stating that parental immunity ought to be
abrogated except in two situations:
"Nevertheless, we consider the wide prevalence
of liability insurance in personal injury actions
a proper element to be considered in making the
policy decision of whether to abrogate parental
immunity in negligence actions. This is because
in a great majority of such actions, where such
iIIllilunity has been abolished, the existence of
insurance tends to negate any possible disruption
of family harmony and discipline.
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"(2,3) After a careful review of the arguments
for and against the parental-immunity rule in
negligence cases, we are of the opinion that it
ought to be abrogated except in these two situations:
(1) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of parental authority over the
child; and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion
with respect to the provision of food, clothing,
housing, medical and dental services, and other care."
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the case of Lemmen v.
Servais, 39 Wis 2d 75, 158 NW2d 341 (1968) states:
"The iilllilunity granted by these two exceptions is
accorded the parent, not because he is a parent,
but because as a parent he pursues a course within
the family constellation which society exacts of him
and which is beneficial to the state. The parental
non-liability is not granted as a reward, but as a
means of enabling the parents to discharge the
duties wJ:iich society exacts."
In the very interesting case of Petty Walker v. Tully
B. Milton, 268 So. Rptr. 2d, 654, (1974 La), it held:
"Statute prohibiting suit by unemancipated minor
against either parent during their marriage did not
destroy substantive causes of action arising between
parent and child but rather operated only as procedural bar to an action, and thus contribution was
allowable in favor of joint tort-feasor against
parent whose negligence contributed to her child's
injuries;"
Counsel for Mr. Bishop sets forth on page 6 of his
Brief the case of Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 384 P2d 389 (Utah
1963).

That case turned on two basis:

and (2) interspousal immunity.

(1) the guest statute,

The fact that Utah has adopted

interspousal innnunity as herein set forth does not apply to
the inter-family irrnnunity family relationships.
work, "Law of Torts", 4th Edition,

~122,

As Prosser in his

(1971), states:
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"Any tort action between husband and wife encountered
at the outset the common law doctrine of the legal
identity of the two. It has been said, whether
humorously or not, that at collllilon law husband and
wife were one person, and that person was the husband
--which is not strictly accurate, since the criminal
law, at least, regarded them as separate individuals,
and the wife could be named as a party to a civil
action, even though her husband must be joined with
her, if he were alive when suit was brought. But
as to her personal and property rights, the very
legal existence of the wife was regarded as suspended
for the duration of the marriage, and merged into
that of the husband, so that she ~ost the capacity
to contract for herself, or to sue or be sued without
joining the husband."
But Prosser says in §122, commencing at page 864:
The com_mon law had no similar conception of unity of
legal identity in the case of a parent and his minor
child. Although the parent was given custody of the
child, the latter remained a separate legal person,
entitled to the benefits of his own property and
to the enforcement of his own choses in action, including those in tort, and was liable in turn as an
individual for his own torts. Consequently there were
no such theoretical difficulties, no emancipation
acts similar to the Married Women's Acts were necessary
and statutory construction has not entered into the
question of tort liability between parent and child.
In matters affecting property, causes of action
seems always to have been freely recognized, on the
part of either the parent or the child. Although
there were no old decisions, the speculation on the
matter has been that there is no good reason to think
that.the English law would not permit actions for
personal torts as well, subject always to the parent's
privilege to enforce reasonable discipline against the
child; and there are decisions in Canada and Scotland
holding that such an action will lie. But beginning
in 1891 with Hewlett v. George a Mississippi case of
false imprisonment which cited no authorities, the
American courts adopted a general rule refusing to
allow actions between parent and minor child for
personal torts, whether they are intentional or
negligent in character. For reasons that are not
altogether clear, however, and perhaps are to be
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explained only on the basis of an initial retreat
from the general rule, the action nearly always has
been permitted against one who is not a parent but
merely stands in the place of one, such as a stepfather or another relative who has custody of the
child.
The courts which deny the action have relied heavily
on the analogy of husband and wife, which seems
uite ina licable because of the difference in the
common aw concept o t ere ations, and t e a sence
of statutes to be construed.
Prosser then continues on under

~122

at page 867:

As in the case of husband and wife, some courts have
allowed recovery when the relation has been terminated
by the death of either parent or child, and the action
is brought under a wrongful death or a survival act.
Even this has been extended to permit an action between
parent or loss of services of another child, on the
ground that these are derivati~e actions, turning
primarily upon the possibility of suit by another.
Finally, there are half a dozen courts which have
allowed recovery where the child is injured in the
course of a business, rather than a personal activity
of the parent, making an artificial separation of
vocational from personal capacity, which suggests a
dislike of the immunity more than anything else.
Finally, in 1963, Wisconsin took the lead in declaring
that the parent-child immunity was abrogated entirely
in that jurisdiction, except as to exercises of parental
control and authority, or parental discretion with
respect to such matters as food and care. The decision
set off something of a long overdue landslide; and at
the present writing it has been followed in Alaska,
Arizona, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, and North Dakota. The prediction is easy
to make that the number of such jurisdictions will
henceforth be rapidly on the increase.
The effect which liability insurance has thus far
had upon the family immunities is not very easy to
evaluate. Where there is such insurance, it becomes
still more difficult to maintain most of the stock
arguments against allowing recovery. Since the
defendant will not have to pay out of his own pocket,
it is obvious that the family exchquer will not be
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d~minished, and that domestic harmony will not be

?isrupted.so much by allowing the action as by denying
it; and since the party really interested in the
defense is the liability insurer, any conception of
family unity and sanctity can scarcely extend to or
protect him. And where insurance is readily available,
there is no great need to be tender of defendants who
do not have it, since decisions imposing liability
may be expected to lead to its purchase . . . "
The rationale of almost all of the cases is basically set forth
by the Supreme Court of California, in the matter of James Gibson
vs. Robert Gibson, 479 P2d 648:
"No sooner had American courts including our own,
embraced the parental irrnnunity doctrine than they
began to fashion a number of qualifications and
exceptions to it . . .
The danger to family harmony was the only rationale
for immunity mentioned in Trudell. In Self, however,
we termed this argument 'illogical and unsound.'
Observing that spouses commonly sue each other over
property matters, we concluded that 'It would not
appear that such assumed conjugal harmony is any
more endangered by tort actions than by property actions
·k 7~ ·k • ' ( 5 8 Ca 1 . 2 d 6 8 3 , 6 9 0 , 2 6 Ca 1 . Rp tr . . 9 7 , 101 ,
376 P.2d 65, 67.) Indeed, as we shall discuss, infra,
the risk of family discord is much less in negligence
actions, where an adverse judgment will normally be
satisfied by the defendant family member's insurance
carrier, than in property actions, where it will
generally be paid out of the defendant's pocket.
Since the- law has long allowed a child to sue his
parent over property matters (King v. Sells (1938)
193 Wash. 294, 75 P.2d 130; Lamb v. Lamb (1895) 146
N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26), the rationale of self is
equally applicable to parent-child tort suits .
. . . In deciding to abrogate parental immunity, we
are also persuaded by several policy factors. One is
the obvious but important legal principle that "when
there is negligence, the rule is liability, immunity
is the exception . . .
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Secondly, we feel that we cannot overlook the widespread prevalence of liability insurance and its
practical effect on intra-family suits. Although it
is obvious that insurance does not create liability
where none otherwise exists (Emery v. Emery, supra
45 Cal.2d 421, 431, 289 P.2d 218), it is unrealistic
to ignore this factor in making an informed policy
decision on whether to abolish parental negligence
immunity. (See Goller v. White, supra, 20 Wis, 2d
402, ·412, 122 N.W. 2d 193.) We can no longer consider child-parent actions on the outmoded assumption
that parents may be required to pay damages to their
children . . .
By our decision today we join 10 other states which
have already abolished parental tort immunity. We
think it is significant that since 1963, when the
Wisconsin Supreme Court drove the first wedge (Goller
v. White, Supra, 20 Wis.2d 402, 122 NW2d 193), other
jurisdictions have steadily hacked away at this legal
deadwood."
Then finally, as the Utah Supreme Court, 1976, upholding
the contribution statute has set forth in Bushnell v. Sillitoe, 550
P.2d 1284:
78-27-39 provides: "The right of contribution shall
exist among joint tort-feasors, but a joint tort-feasor
shall not be entitled to a money judgment for contribution until he has, by payment, discharged the
connnon liability or more than nis prorata share thereof.
In Au~ustus v. Bean, 58 Cal.2d 270, 14 Cal. Rptr.
641,63 P.2d 873 (1961), the court observed that
the statutory system for contribution did not concern the relationship of tort-feasors to the one
injured, but dealt with the relationship of tortfeasors to each other; when after entry of judgment
one of them discharged the common liability.

POINT II
UTAH SHOULD FOLLOW THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRIBUTION STATUTE AS INTERPRETED BY THE HIGHEST COURTS
OF THAT STATE BECAUSE UTAH BORROWED ITS COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE STATUTE FROM WISCONSIN.
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In this case the Utah Legislature on March 8, 1973,
passed the Comparative Negligence Statute borrowing it completely
from Wisconsin wherein it had been interpreted since 1931.
As stated in 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, §167, page 370:
"Although the full faith and credit clause of the
Federal Constitution does not so require, where the
statute of a sister state is before the court, the
construction placed upon the statute by the highest
courts of that state should be followed. This is so
even though the courts of the forum would place a
different construction upon similar language in a
statute within their own jurisdiction. Similarly, the
construction of a statute of a foreign country should
be governed by the decisionsof the courts of that country. If the court of the forum is not afforded such
aid, it must give to the statute the best construction
it is able to give, in the same manner that it
should construe an act of its own legislature."
Our Supreme Court in the case of Donahue v. Warner Bros.
Pictures Distributing Corp., 272 P.2d 177, stated the general rule
that when a statute is taken from another state, the construction
on that statute or its interpretation will be followed.

Our court

stated as follows:
"(1,2) It is well settled that 'when the legislature
of a state has used a statute of another state or
country as a guide for the preparation and enactment
of a statute, the courts of the adopting state will
usually adopt the construction placed on the statute
in the jurisdiction of its inception.'"
In reference to that particular case, our Supreme Court then went
on to state the general law:
"
. our Legislature may be assumed to have been
aware of the construction of the statute by the
courts of the state of its origin at the time of our
enactment . . . "
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The Supreme Court in the case of Utah Power & Light v.
Public Service Commission, 152 P.2d 542, at page 556 states:
" . . . The only importance attached to the argument
that the Utah Act was copied from the statutes of
Idaho rather than from the statutes of California
or vice versa is this: When statutes of another state
are adopted, it is assumed that the prior construction
placed upon such adopted statutes by the courts of
the other state is also adopted . . . "
It is also submitted that the following states have now
adopted the comparative negligence statute:
Alaska
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Florida
Kansas
Montana
Nevada
New Jersey
New York
North Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Washington
Wyoming
It is now submitted, that almost uniformly, that every state that
has adopted the Comparative Negligence statute has also adopted
the contribution and abolished the parental immunity doctrine, ;.,->.::
never really was common law and was not adopted by any state until
Mississippi in about 1910.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN GRANTING A JUDGMENT
FOR CONTRIBUTION AGAINST THE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT
BECAUSE THE THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT IS A JOINT TORT
FEASOR.
The trial court did not error in granting the judgment for
contribution against the third-party defendant because the thirdparty defendant is a joint tort-feasor because the basic the basic
argument of the third-party defendant is that she cannot be a joint
tort-feasor because an action will not lie against her because of
the inter-family immunity doctrine.

If the inter-family immunity

doctrine falls because they are both joint tort-feasors so does the
argument of Point III because it is exactly the same argument as
set forth in Point I and Point II, because they are both dependent upon each other.

This has been completely answered by our

Supreme Court in Bushnell v. Sillitoe, Utah (1976) 550 P.2d 1984:
§78-27-39 provides: "The right of contribution shall
exist amont joint tort-feasors, but a joint tort-feasor
shall not be entitled to a money judgment for contribution until he has, by payment, discharged the
common liability or more than his prorata share thereof.
In Augustus v. Bean, 58 Cal. 2d 270, 14 Cal. Rptr.
641, 363 P.2d 873, (1961), the court observed that
the statutory system for contribution did not concern
the relationship of tor-feasors to the one injured,
but dealt with the relationship of tort-feasors to
each other; when after entry of judgment one of them
discharged the common liability."

CONCLUSION
There are now approximately 23 states which have abolished
the parent-child immunity doctrine, which was an 1891 Mississippi
protege on the basis that inter-family relations would be threatened
and destroyed and the harmony of the home would be injured contrary
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to the policy of law.

This was on the theory that after a father

has maimed, crippled and beaten his son or his daughter there is a
state of peace and harmony left to be disturbed, and if the
son or daughter is sufficiently injured or angry to sue the
father for it, they will be soothed and deterred from reprisal
by denying them a legal remedy even though the child may have left
the home.

Even though the same courts refuse to find any

disruption of family tranquility, if the son or the daughter
sues their father or their mother for a tort to their property,
or brings a criminal prosecution against them, or the brother or
sister sue each other.

If this reasoning appeals to anyone, let

him by all means adopt it.
, Again, are we not faced with the proposition that in
general minor children are entitled to the same redress for wrongs
done to them as other people.

As the Supreme Court said in

Petersen v. City and County of Honolulu, 462 P.2d 1007, quoting
from Barlow v. Iblings, Iowa, 156 N.W.2d 105 (1968), where is
there justice when a six-year old child looses his hand in an
electric meat cutter because of the negligence of his father and
is prohibited from suing his father because the courts say that
to allow the suit would disrupt the harmony and tranquility of
the family relationship.

"In our view, such results are

unconsc:~""':-.~:

It is the conclusion and the position of the third-party
plaintiff that the third-party complaint should be allowed.

The

Legislature moved boldly in enacting Utah Code Annotated, §78-27-39
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(1953), allowing contribution among joint tort-feasors where before
there was no such remedy in Utah.

Allowing this Complaint is con-

sistent with the intent behind this statute and does not violate the
principles of inter-family immunity doctrine either now or as it
existed at cormnon law or by the majority of the states that have
rejected it.
Dated this

day of October, 1980.
Respectfully submitted,

T omas A. Du
Attorney for De
Ten Broadway Buildin , Suite 510
Salt·Lake City, Utah 84101
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing to
Philip R. Fishler, Attorney for Plaintiff and Third-party defendant,
604 Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
this

84111, postage prepaid,

day of October, 1980.
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